Research
My research examines information acquisition and the role of disclosure in settings where information frictions are first-order and policy-relevant, with a particular emphasis on banking and debt contracting settings.
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Working papers
- "Information Acquisition and Bank Fragility: Evidence from EDGAR Searches"
Solo-authored.
I study how market participants acquire information from banks' financial disclosures and what this means for bank fragility. Using a bank-user-level measure of information acquisition based on search volume on SEC EDGAR, I document that information acquisition is state-contingent - disproportionately higher for banks which are closer to default, and after negative news from the media. I also find that uninsured deposit flows decrease when information acquisition is higher, with no relation on insured deposit flows. The evidence highlights the role of information acquisition, beyond information disclosure, in shaping financial stability outcomes.
- "The Information Content of Loan Contract Disclosures"
with Paul Demeré and Francesco Grossetti.
We use natural language processing to extract latent topics from public loan contracts and show that these topics and other loan terms are predictive of future borrower outcomes, such as borrower performance, investment, bankruptcy, and stock return volatility, incremental to standard prediction variables. Our results indicate that loan contracts contain substantial information content of value to many corporate stakeholders and highlight the richness of unstructured legal text in loan contracts.
Work in progress
"The Economic Consequences of Centralizing Bank Regulatory Disclosures"
with Jannis Bischof and Ferdinand Elfers.
"Bank Failures With and Without Information Acquisition"
with Elena Carletti and Filippo De Marco.
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